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21. Introduction
In the standard economic model of individual decision-making, psychological 
factors play no role in understanding human behaviour. While this approach 
has proved useful for predicting and interpreting behaviour in a wide variety of 
contexts, psychologists have apparently identified several phenomena that are 
not so easily understood under the conventional economic paradigm.
The focus of this paper concerns one such phenomenon, labelled situation-
avoidance by social psychologists (e.g., see Crocker and Park 2003, 299). To an 
economist, situation-avoidance might be better labelled truth-avoidance, as the  
phenomenon concerns an action (or inaction) that purposely avoids the acqui-
sition of economically valuable information relating to one’s personal charac-
teristics – even when the cost of acquiring such information appears to be zero. 
Needless to say, such behaviour is logically inconsistent with the basic premises of 
conventional economic theory. To social psychologists, however, truth-avoidance 
makes perfect sense, once it is recognized that individuals appear to care directly 
about how they view themselves; that the acquisition of new information can 
affect this view; and that human behaviour appears to be governed, at least to 
some extent, by a concern for protecting or enhancing one’s self-esteem. Avoid-
ing the situation (truth-avoidance) is considered the first line of defence among 
self-esteem management strategies (see Hoyle et al. 1999; Crocker and Park 2003).
Our approach is to take the psychologists’ view seriously and at face value. We 
do this by embedding the underlying psychological assumptions in an otherwise 
standard economic model. We then investigate and evaluate the logical impli-
cations of the hybrid theory. Our economic model is modified by extending the 
commodity space over which preferences are defined to include an object that 
reflects an individual’s (rational) estimate of his own (unobserved) ability. We 
label this object self-esteem. Individuals are confronted with two choices, one of 
which strictly dominates the other in a pecuniary sense. The dominant strategy is 
necessarily associated with gathering information concerning one’s (unobserved) 
ability. The dominated strategy (truth-avoidance) forgoes an obvious pecuniary 
gain and reveals no information. We restrict belief-formation to be rational (in 
the sense of respecting Bayes’ rule). As such, individual actions (or inactions) 
influence the evolution of one’s self-assessment over time. For individuals who 
do not value self-esteem, the evolution of this self-assessment is immaterial (the 
dominant strategy is always preferred). However, under specific circumstances, 
truth-avoidance can be consistent with rational behaviour.
The simple fact that people care about self-esteem (or possess ‘ego-utility,’ 
to borrow a term from Ko¨szegi 2006) does not, in itself, imply anything about 
behaviour. In other words, simply ‘sticking self-esteem into the utility function’ 
does not necessarily place restrictions on behaviour. As is well known, strict 
concavity of the self-esteem utility function is needed. That is, ‘good news’ that 
would lead one to revise upward one’s estimate of one’s ability must be valued 
less than ‘bad news’ that would lead to an equivalent downward revision. Hence,
3concavity of utility over self-esteem implies a form of ‘information aversion.’
Naturally, avoiding the truth further requires that individuals believe that they will
learn something about themselves from facing the new information. This requires
that individuals lack ‘confidence’ in the accuracy of their own self-assessment and
that individuals perceive that future opportunities are driven at least partly by skill
(relative to luck). These results are by now generally well known in the economics
literature.
The focus of our modelling, however, is to characterize the nature of individu-
als who are likely to display a propensity for truth-avoidance. We find that, ceteris
paribus, high-income/wealth individuals are more likely to avoid the truth and
that individuals with high self-esteem are less likely to avoid the truth. In other
words, truth-avoiders tend to be those with incomes that are high relative to the
self-assessment of their own ability. To the extent that income and self-esteem are
not perfectly correlated within a population, the phenomenon of truth-avoidance
is therefore likely to present among all sorts of individuals. We also show that
the propensity for truth avoidance is decreasing in an individual’s ‘confidence’ in
the accuracy of self-assessment and the extent to which the individual perceives
future opportunities to be driven by luck. These are all potentially testable im-
plications, given the type of data that are commonly produced by questionnaires
and experiments conducted by psychologists.
These results may be of interest to both economists and social psychologists.
For the economist, our findings suggest that the traditional practice of ignor-
ing psychological factors like self-esteem may be justified in some circumstances
but not in others. These circumstances include environments where individuals
are likely to be sufficiently confident in the accuracy of their self-assessment
(which is not the same thing as saying that they are necessarily accurate in their
self-assessment); or when they do not display ‘information aversion.’ For the psy-
chologist, our findings identify various individual characteristics that are likely to
render individuals more or less prone to avoiding the truth. Among other things,
the theory developed here may be useful in guiding experimental design.
Our paper fits within a growing body of theoretical work designed to explain
what, on the surface at least, appears to be ‘anomalous’ economic behaviour.
One strand of this literature simply assumes that individuals are prone to making
cognitive mistakes (e.g., see Rabin and Schrag 1999; Gervais and Odean 1999).
Another strand of the literature, exemplified by the recent work of Benabou and
Tirole (2002a,b), models the manipulation of self-image as a strategic game played
among time-dated personalities.
Our own approach is most closely related to Ko¨szegi (2001, 2006) and
Weinberg (2004), who, like ourselves, model self-esteem as ego-utility. Our pa-
per differs from these primarily in focus and the particular questions addressed.
Ko¨szegi (2006) and Weinberg (2004) are primarily concerned with explaining
how people may rationally become overconfident (something that we do not ad-
dress). Ko¨szegi (2001), on the other hand, explains why it may be rational for
people to avoid reviewing new information concerning past decisions and why it
4may be rational to procrastinate in making decisions when there is no pecuniary 
gain from doing so. We view our paper as complementary to this literature, as it 
simplifies along some dimensions, but delves deeper along others.
2. Basic model
Consider an economy with people who have preferences defined over lotteries 
of consumption c ∈ R. These preferences are represented by an expected utility 
function E[u(c)], where E denotes an expectations operator and u′′ ≤ 0 < u′. 
Each person has an initial endowment (w, z) ∈ R2 , which is distributed in some 
arbitrary manner across the population. The par
+
ameter w represents the return 
associated with some economic opportunity (the quality of a job, investment, 
mate, etc.), while z represents non-labour income.
Each individual may take one of two actions, which we denote I ∈ {0, 1}. 
The action I = 0 corresponds to consuming one’s initial endowment, so that 
c = w + z. The action I = 1 corresponds to an act that may potentially improve 
one’s circumstance. We model this potential improvement as a new opportunity, 
whose value w ′ is determined by the random process:
w ′ = a + e, (1)
where a represents an endowed ‘ability’ and e represents ‘luck.’ Assume that
ability is distributed across the population in a Gaussian manner. Furthermore,
assume that each individual faces an i.i.d. e ∼ N(0, σ 2).1
Assume that the action I = 1 entails no pecuniary cost. Assume, further, that
one always retains the option of discarding the new opportunity w ′ in favour of
the old w , so that c = max{w + z, w ′ + z}. One interpretation of this model
is that I = 1 represents a job-search activity (with perfect recall), with a wage
offer that depends in part on skill and in part on match-quality. The choice I = 0
would in this case represent declining the search option. In the language of social
psychology, we want to think of I = 0 as corresponding to ‘situation-avoidance.’
Given that there is absolutely no cost to ‘facing the situation,’ the only rational
choice here would be I = 1.
2.1. Information and beliefs
In general, an individual may not know with certainty his or her own true ability
level a. In this case, we assume that individuals are Bayesian. In the present
context, since (a, e) are distributed joint-normally, Bayes’ rule corresponds to the
Kalman filter (see Ljungqvist and Sargent 2000, 65–71).
1 Implicitly then, we allow for negative consumption. However, one could guarantee positive
consumption by assuming instead that c = exp (w) + z. As nothing in our analysis hinges on this
matter, we allow for negative consumption only to simplify notation.
5That is, imagine that each person begins with a prior (b, ), so that one’s
ability is perceived to be distributed normally with mean b and variance  =
E[a − b]2. Since b represents a person’s self-assessment of his own ability, we refer
to b as ‘self-esteem.’ Note that  is a parameter that describes an individual’s
‘confidence’ in his self-assessment. In particular, −1 is referred to as the precision
of the estimate (b), so that −1 = ∞ represents the case of an individual who is
supremely confident in his self-assessment (which is not to say that the self-
assessment is necessarily correct).
Now, conditional on I = 1, an individual generates a new opportunity w ′ = a +
e. Not knowing one’s true ability, however, implies that an individual faces a
signal-extraction problem. Given b and the new information associated with w ′,
an individual will update his self-assessment b′ = E[a | b, w ′] according to
b′ = (1 − k)b + kw ′, (2)
where
k = 
 + σ 2 . (3)
In addition, the perceived precision of one’s self-assessment evolves according to
′ = σ
2
 + σ 2 . (4)
Of course, in the case of I = 0 (truth-avoidance), no new information is gathered,
so that
b′ = b
′ = . (5)
Thus, (2) asserts that b′ is given by a convex combination of one’s prior b and
new information w ′ (in the case for which I = 1). The Kalman-gain variable k
determines how much weight is to be placed on the latter two objects. For a given
, we see from (3) that k is decreasing in the ‘noise’ term σ . That is, if the value
of a new opportunity is determined primarily by luck rather than ability (i.e.,
a large σ ), then any optimal reassessment of ability should largely ignore new
information and rely more heavily on prior beliefs.
As well, note that for a given σ , (3) also reveals that k is a decreasing function of
−1. Recall that −1 measures the (perceived) precision of one’s current estimate
of ability. As →0, one becomes increasingly ‘confident’ in one’s self-assessment,
so that k → 0 (it is optimal to ignore noisy information and rely more heavily on
prior beliefs). Equation (4) describes how the precision of one’s self-assessment
evolves.2
2 Extending this model to an infinite horizon, equation (4) implies that infinitely-lived individuals
could potentially learn their true ability (i.e.,  t → 0 as t → ∞).
6Modifying the information structure in this manner affects how individuals 
form expectations, but otherwise does not affect behaviour (it still remains op-
timal to choose I = 1, regardless of one’s initial condition as summarized by 
the triplet (w , b, ). To show this formally, let F(w ′, b) denote the cumulative 
distribution function for w ′ conditional on b. Then the expected utility payoff 
associated with I = 1 is given by
E max{u(w + z), u(w ′ + z)} =
∫
w
u(w ′ + z)F(dw ′, b) + F(w, b)u(w + z).
This obviously dominates the utility payoff associated with avoiding the situation;
i.e. E max{u(w + z), u(w ′ + z)} ≥ u(w + z).3
3. A model of self-esteem
In the model above, individuals are endowed with some prior b that measures their
assessment of their own (unobserved) ability. Individuals are also endowed with a
prior view  that measures the perceived precision of their self-assessment. In the
basic model outlined above, neither of these objects plays a role in determining
behaviour. Such a view is contrary to social psychology, where the conventional
wisdom is that we can not understand individual behaviour without first having
an understanding of self-esteem (i.e., see Leary and Tangney 2003).
We model the psychologist’s view here by extending the commodity space to
include lotteries over the posterior belief b′, so that preferences can be represented
by an expected utility function:
E[u(c) + λv(b′)]. (6)
The parameter λ ≥ 0 in (6) simply indexes the degree to which a person cares
about his self-esteem. The model presented earlier is just the special case in which
λ = 0. Following Ko¨szegi (2001), we assume that v is strictly increasing and
weakly concave. Strict concavity of v implies that the person displays a form of
‘information aversion.’ That is, good news that would lead one to revise upward
one’s estimate of one’s ability is valued less than bad news that would lead to an
equivalent downward revision. Because we do not want our results to hinge on
hard-to-interpret third-derivative properties of v , we assume for simplicity that v
takes a quadratic form; that is,
v(b) = αb − 0.5βb2, (7)
where α, β ≥ 0 are parameters.4
3 As one of our referees has pointed out, it is crucial here that I = 0 does not depend on ability,
while the return to option I = 1 does.
4 We will also restrict attention to cases where b < α/β, so that v ′(b) > 0 always.
73.1. Optimal decision-making
Consider an individual described by the list of parameters (w , b, , λ, α, β, σ )
describing preferences, technology, and information. This person must make a
choice I ∈ {0, 1} to maximize (6) subject to c = max{w ′ + z, w + z} and subject
to the rational updating of beliefs (2)–(5).
The utility payoff associated with I = 0 is given by
V0(w, z, b) = u(w + z) + λv(b). (8)
The expected utility payoff associated with I = 1 is given by
V1(w, z, b) = E max{u(w ′ + z) + λv(b′), u(w + z) + λv(b′)}
=
∫
max{u(w ′ + z), u(w + z)}F(dw ′, b) + λ
∫
v(b′)F(dw ′, b)
=
∫
w
u(w ′ + z)F(dw ′, b) + u(w + z)F(w, b) + λ
∫
v(b′)F(dw ′, b),
(9)
where b′ satisfies (2).
Observe that, while I = 0 removes the attractive option of potentially up-
grading the value of one’s opportunity, it has the benefit of preserving one’s
self-esteem (since no information is gathered that would necessarily lead one to
update one’s belief ). For obvious reasons, we label such an action truth-avoidance.
Conversely, while I = 1 represents an expected pecuniary gain; such an action
exposes a person to ‘self-esteem risk.’ To the extent that an individual cares
about self-esteem, the economically rational (i.e., utility-maximizing) choice is no
longer obvious; that is, depending on parameters, it is possible that V1(w, z, b)≷
V0(w, z, b).
Define the following two terms:
(w, z, b) ≡
∫
w
u(w ′ + z)F(dw ′, b) + u(w + z)F(w, b) − u(w + z) (10)
(b) ≡ λ
[
v(b) −
∫
v(b′)F(dw ′, b)
]
. (11)
Here,  represents the net ‘pecuniary’ gain from gathering information and 
represents the net ‘non-pecuniary’ benefit associated with preserving one’s self-
esteem. Note that V1(w , z, b) − V0(w , z, b) ≡  (w , z, b) − (b).
Observe that the net pecuniary gain from gathering information is monoton-
ically decreasing in w ; that is,
∂
∂w
= u′(w + z) [F(w, b) − 1] < 0. (12)
8Intuitively, the closer one is to the top of the wage distribution, the less likely 
one is to draw a new opportunity that dominates the one in hand. Note that this 
result is independent of the curvature properties of u; that is, it continues to hold 
when u′′ = 0 (or u′ = κ > 0 constant). For a given , then, one can characterize 
a reservation wage w R satisfying
(w R, z, b) = (b). (13)
The optimal strategy may therefore be expressed as
I∗ =
{
0 if w R(z, b) < w ≤ ∞
1 otherwise
. (14)
Notice that if (b) ≡ 0, as in the conventional model studied earlier, then
w R = ∞. In other words, it strictly pays to ‘face the situation’ for anyone with an
endowed opportunity w below the upper bound of the wage distribution when
self-esteem is not a factor in the decision-making process. Of course, if  > 0
is a possibility, then w R < ∞, so that, in general, there will be circumstances
in which truth-avoidance constitutes a rational choice. These circumstances are
now described.
PROPOSITION 1. For v(b) satisfying (7),  = 0.5λβ2(σ 2 + )−1; so that  > 0
if and only if λ > 0, β > 0  > 0, and σ 2 < ∞.
The proof of this proposition is provided in the appendix. The logic for the
necessary conditions for truth-avoidance, λ > 0, β > 0, is obvious. Naturally,
an additional requirement is that the individual believes that he will learn about
himself from facing the new information. This requires that an individual lack
‘confidence’ in the accuracy of his self-assessment  > 0 and that an individual
perceive that future opportunities are driven at least partly by skill (relative to
luck) σ 2 < ∞. These results are by now generally well known in the economics
literature.
4. Characteristics of truth-avoiders
In this section, we turn to the focus of the paper, the attempt to flesh out some of
the characteristics of truth-avoiders. Our approach here is to consider a popula-
tion of individuals who are identical in every respect, except along one particular
dimension in the parameter vector (w , z, b, , λ, α, β, σ ). Of course, the analysis
that follows assumes that  > 0.
94.1. Value of endowments
Imagine a population of individuals who differ only in terms of the value of their
current economic opportunity w . It follows directly from the optimal strategy
described by (14):
PROPOSITION 2. (Ceteris paribus) Truth-avoiders will be concentrated among those
who are currently endowed with relatively good economic opportunities.
At first, this result may sound surprising, but, in fact, the intuition is simple
and follows directly from the fact that  is monotonically decreasing in w . In
particular, note that while there is no pecuniary cost to gathering information,
the upside from doing so is relatively small for those already close to the top.
Likewise, for those near the bottom, the upside potential is relatively large. Thus,
for a given (b, ), the former group has a stronger incentive to avoid the truth.
Note that this result does not hinge on the curvature properties of u (in particular,
the result continues to hold even in the case u′′ = 0).
Let us now imagine a population of individuals who differ solely in terms
of their endowed ‘wealth’ as measured by z (non-labour income).5 The relevant
comparative static here is obtained from (13):
dw R
dz
= − ∂/∂z
∂/∂w
,
where
∂
∂z
=
∫
w
u′(w ′ + z)F(dw ′, b) − u′(w + z) [1 − F(w, b)] .
The fact that ∂/∂w < 0 has been established in (12). The first thing we can
establish is that if individuals are risk neutral in the sense that u′′ = 0 (or u′ = κ >
0 a constant), then
∂
∂z
= κ [1 − F(w, b)] − κ [1 − F(w, b)] = 0.
In other words, the propensity for truth-avoidance is unrelated to wealth when
individuals are risk neutral. Let us now suppose u′′ < 0 and define κ ≡ u′(w + z)
> 0. It then follows that∫
w
u′(w ′ + z)F(dw ′, b) < κ [1 − F(w, b)] ,
so that ∂/∂z < 0, which implies dwR/dz < 0. One can therefore establish
5 We thank a referee for suggesting this exercise.
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PROPOSITION  3. (Ceteris paribus) If u′′ < 0, truth-avoiders will be concentrated 
among the rich.
The intuition for this result is also rather straightforward. Given the concavity 
of u, higher levels of wealth imply that the marginal utility associated with search-
ing for better options is lower. In other words, there is a sense in which the wealthy 
can better afford to take actions (or inactions) that protect their self-esteem.
4.2. The level of self-esteem
Imagine now a population that differs only in prior self-assessment b. The relevant 
comparative static is again obtained from (13):
dw R
db
= − ∂/∂b
∂/∂w
.
The fact that ∂/∂w < 0 has been established in (12). As F(w , b) denotes the
distribution of wage opportunities conditional on a (perceived) mean b, one would
expect that the net pecuniary gain to gathering information is increasing in b, that
is, that ∂/∂b > 0. One can establish this formally by noting that F(w , bl) > F(w ,
bh) for bl < bh (i.e., the former conditional distribution stochastically dominates
the latter). It follows then that  (w , z, bh) >  (w , z, bl) and ∂/∂b > 0
then emerges as one takes bh → bl. As a consequence, it follows that dwR/db > 0.
In other words, a higher level of self-esteem increases one’s reservation op-
portunity level, thereby reducing the range of values of w for which it makes
sense to engage in truth-avoidance. Someone with high self-esteem finds it more
costly to engage in truth-avoidance simply because he expects a better outcome
by accepting the signal.6 From this result, we have the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 4. (Ceteris paribus) Truth-avoiders will consist of those who are
currently endowed with relatively low self-esteem.
Taken together, propositions 2 and 4 suggest that the phenomenon of truth-
avoidance is likely to be concentrated among those individuals who are in some
sense ‘doing well’ relative to their self-assessment of ability (i.e., a high w/b ratio).
Thus, our theory suggests that the phenomenon of truth-avoidance is likely to
be found among individuals throughout the income distribution. What matters
in our model is not the level of income or self-esteem but rather their relative
magnitudes. This is potentially a testable implication.
6 It should be noted that this result is in part due to the fact in our model, the value of self-esteem is
independent of an individual’s prior. This, does not need to be the case. For example, individuals
with higher initial self-esteem may have intrinsically more to lose from learning the truth. For a
more thorough discussion on the topic, please see Benabou and Tirole (2002).
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4.3. Preferences
Obviously, the propensity to avoid the truth is increasing in λ and β. This non-
surprising result follows directly from (14). It is worth repeating that while psy-
chologists appear to emphasize the parameter λ, the growing economics literature
on the subject shows that some degree of ‘information-aversion’ is required as
well. There are experiments that attempt to measure the affective or emotional
response of individuals to given self-esteem-damaging events (Hoyle et al. 1999,
87). The evidence is that individuals with low self-esteem have a stronger affective
response to a given self-esteem-damaging failure.
4.4. Confidence in one’s self-assessment
Recall that −1 represents the perceived accuracy of one’s self-assessment. From
proposition 1, it is easy to verify that  is an increasing function of  (i.e., a
decreasing function of −1); this operates through the effect that  has on k in
(3). In words, what this means is that among otherwise similar people, those who
are confident in the accuracy of their self-assessment are less likely to engage in
truth-avoidance.
PROPOSITION 5. The propensity to avoid the truth is decreasing in the perceived
accuracy of one’s self-assessment.
Proposition 5 suggests that the following is possible. Consider two people i =
1, 2, who are identical in every way except for differences in (bi,  i). Suppose that
b1 > b2 and 1 > 2 = 0. That is, while the type-1 person has relatively high
self-esteem, this high self-assessment is associated with a degree of uncertainty.
The type-2 person, on the other hand, is absolutely confident in his/her self-
assessment. Our theory asserts that the low-esteem type-2 person will not practice
truth-avoidance; while the high-esteem type-1 person may.
4.5. Noisiness of information
PROPOSITION 6. The propensity to avoid the truth decreases with the noisiness of
the new signal σ 2.
dwR
dσ 2
= ∂/∂σ
2 − ∂/∂σ 2
∂/∂w
.
Recall that ∂/∂w < 0. Also recall that σ 2 measures a person’s perception of
the relative role that luck plays in determining the value of future opportunities.
From  in proposition 1, we have ∂/∂σ 2 < 0. The intuition is that the greater
the perceived role of luck (noisy signals), the less costly will it be to expose oneself
to information-gathering activities that may damage self-esteem. From (10) the
effect of σ on  simply reinforces the effect on  or ∂/∂σ 2 > 0. The intuition
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for this is simple. Observe that an increase in σ represents a mean-preserving 
spread of the (normal) distribution F . Since individuals have complete recall, a 
mean-preserving spread in F serves to increase the upside potential of gathering 
information, without altering the downside risk. Thus, dwR/dσ 2 > 0 and an 
increase in σ 2 leads to a decline in the propensity to avoid the truth.
Propositions 5 and 6 are interesting because they suggest that increases in ‘un-
certainty’ along different dimensions can have different effects on the propensity 
for truth-avoidance. That is, increased uncertainty about how past events have 
influenced the accuracy of one’s current self-assessment (an increase in ) serves 
to increase truth-avoidance. In contrast, increased uncertainty about the value of 
future opportunities serves to decrease truth-avoidance.
5. Conclusion
It is known that several different forces need to be in operation simultaneously 
if avoiding the truth is likely to manifest itself as observed behaviour. For ra-
tional truth-avoidance to arise, people obviously have to care about self-esteem, 
but in a  particular way (they must be averse to self-esteem risk). Further, the 
individual must believe that facing the situation will be informative. This im-
plies that individuals must be less than fully confident in the accuracy of their 
self-assessment, and, on top of this, individuals must believe that luck plays only 
some role in determining their opportunities. Our further analysis suggests that 
the phenomenon of truth-avoidance is likely to be concentrated among those 
individuals who are in some sense ‘doing well’ relative to their self-assessment 
of ability. We also show that the propensity for truth avoidance is decreasing in 
an individual’s ‘confidence’ in the accuracy of self-assessment and the extent to 
which the individual perceives future opportunities to be driven by luck. All these 
are dimensions that are potentially measurable with well-designed experiments 
or other methods.
For the economist, many types of economic behaviour probably remain plau-
sibly interpretable within the context of theories that abstract from self-esteem 
issues. But there may be some (perhaps even a great number of ) phenomena 
for which self-esteem issues may play a prominent role. One important example 
may concern the question of the optimal design of social insurance mechanisms. 
Casual empiricism suggests that when a member of society ‘hits bottom’ (job 
loss, divorce, poverty, etc.), low self-esteem becomes an issue. It becomes an issue 
because of the possibility that low self-esteem can be self-perpetuating (e.g., by 
abstaining from job-search when the costs of doing so are low). In the context of 
the theory developed above (extended to many periods), it is possible for a string 
of unlucky events to drive one’s self-assessment far below one’s true ability, ul-
timately culminating in a state of perpetual truth-avoidance. How should policy 
be designed to deal with such a scenario? We believe that this is a promising area 
of future research.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
 ≡ λ {v(b) − E[v(b′) | b, ]} ,
where E[• | b, ] denotes the expectation conditional on b and . Using the
quadratic form for v , we have
v(b) = αb − (1/2)βb2
v(b′) = αb′ − (1/2)β(b′)2.
Observe that
E[v(b′) | b, ] = αE[b′ | b, ] − (1/2)βE[(b′)2 | b, ]
= αb − (1/2)βE[(b′)2 | b, ],
as E[b′ | b, ] = (1 − k)b + kE[w ′ | b, ] = b. Combining what we have so far:
 = λ(1/2)β {E[(b′)2 | b, ] − b2} .
We can now expand the term E[(b′)2 | b, ]; that is,
E[(b′)2 | b, ] = E[(kw ′ + (1 − k)b)2 | b, ]
= E[k2(w ′)2 + 2k(1 − k)bw ′ + (1 − k)2b2 | b, ]
= k2 E[(w ′)2 | b, ] + 2k(1 − k)bE[w ′ | b, ] + (1 − k)2b2
= k2 E[(w ′)2 | b, ] + (1 − k)b2[2k + (1 − k)]
= k2 E[(w ′)2 | b, ] + (1 − k2)b2.
We still need to expand the term E[(w ′)2 | b, ]; that is,
E[(w ′)2 | b, ] = E[(a + e′)2 | b, ];
= E[a2 | b, ] + 2E[ae′ | b, ] + σ 2.
Given that a and e′ are independent, we know that E[ae′ | b, ] = 0. Moreover,
we also know that E[a2 | b, ] =  + b2. Consequently, we get
E[(w ′)2 | b, ] = b2 +  + σ 2.
Thus, we are left with
 = λ(1/2)β[(1 − k2)b2 + k2b2k2(σ 2 + ) − b2]
= λ(1/2)β 
2
σ 2 +  .
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